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TO:	Major Crosby Lewis
FROM:	PHL
SUBJECT:	Interrogation report of General Sakoto <u>WEDONRA</u> (Chapter 6, Polish I.G.; 20 July 1946).
REFERENCE:	Our Top Secret 294.

10 September 1946

TO: ☐ Major Crosby Lewis  
BB-6

FROM: PHL

SUBJECT: ☐ Interrogation report of General Sakoto WEDONRA  
(Chapter 6, Polish I.G.; 20 July 1946).

REFERENCE: Our Top Secret 294.

1. We attach copies of the subject chapter for your information and such action that you feel may be appropriate.

2. Particular attention is drawn to the fact that COAT does not wish Peter INMON to be approached or interrogated at this stage.

3. The attached chapter is perhaps the most valuable of the reference report. It contains not only our first really direct, authoritative and quantitative evidence on Polish-Japanese collaboration and espionage during and since the war, but also a number of promising operational leads.

4. Your reactions and comments will be greatly appreciated.

5. Please clear any dissemination that you may desire to make in the field with this Headquarters.

Attachments (3)

CC: COAT (cover letter only)

**DESENSITIZED**

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐  
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒  
(2)(C) Foreign Relations ☐

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Date: 2005

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CHAPTER VI

The Polish Intelligence Service

1. Background of Collaboration

The origin of collaboration between the Polish and Japanese General Staffs dates back to the Russo-Japanese war and is based on a common hatred of Russia. In Europe it began early in the century between General Baron AKASHI who was military attache in Stockholm and General PILSUDSKI. A further tie was provided by officers who had been prisoners of war in Japan and who had been so kindly treated by the Japanese that they formed a club and later when Japanese officers came to Poland as diplomatic representatives, they were often entertained by its members. A member of the JAKUBIC family belonged to this club and when Col. SASAKI visited Poland he was invited to stay with them. ONODERA says there were many similar cases. (He adds that it was formerly a Japanese tradition to treat prisoners well and that he was profoundly shocked to hear what had happened during World War II). Active collaboration between the two countries on a military basis began immediately after the last war, when PILSUDSKI was president of Poland. ONODERA does not know the details of what took place at that time. He says that General YAMAHAKI and General FUJITSUKA are well informed in this regard.

Until 1939 the center of Japanese intelligence activity against Russia was always in the Warsaw military attache's office. An arrangement existed whereby Japanese officers were periodically sent to Poland to study Russian codes with the Polish General Staff crypto-analytical section. ONODERA cites the following Japanese officers who were trained according to this agreement:

General HYAKUTAKE in the late 1930's

General OKUBO " " " "

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Col. SAKAI (deceased) in the early 1930's

Col. KUDOO " " "

Col. SAKURAI 1935-36

Col. FUKAI " "

The origin of the Japanese system of analysis and compilation of material from the press and its successful use for intelligence purposes--- which was practiced so extensively during the war---was also learned from the Poles. Col. KOHALSKI, an authority on this system who had visited Japan and was later Polish military attache in Portugal, was their teacher. In exchange for instruction in these matters the Japanese undertook to supply the Poles with Russian code intercepts and other intelligence material obtained from the Far East.

## 2. World War II

As a result of this background of cooperation, when Poland was occupied by the Germans and the Russians in 1939, and the Polish General Staff forced to take refuge in London, Col. GANO, the head of the P.I.S. proposed to Col. UEDA, Japanese Military attache in Warsaw, that the J.I.S. take over the Polish intelligence organizations against Russia and Germany. This offer was officially refused by Tokyo Headquarters because of their alliance to Germany. However, individual Japanese and Polish officers in Europe continued to work together under cover and Poles who had stayed behind on the continent were given Japanese or Manchurian passports and employed in the Embassies and Consulates.

Wishing to take every advantage of the possibilities of this collaboration in 1940, Col. GANO sent a Polish intelligence mission to Japan to collaborate with the Japanese throughout the Far East. The only name which

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ONODERA remembers in this group is that of Lieutenant SKORA who he thinks was connected with crypto-analysis.

3. "PIOTRE IWANOW"

ONODERA's own successful and extensive collaboration with the Poles, was centered around a Polish General Staff officer who worked with him in his office for three and a half years. This happened in the following way. When ONODERA arrived in Stockholm, he found collaboration between the Japanese and the Poles already established and functioning. It has been arranged in 1940 by Col. GANO and Col. NISEMURA, ONODERA's predecessor, who had agreed that a former P.I.S. officer, MICHAEL RUBIKOWSKI (RYBICKOWSKI ?) who had formerly been the head of the German section and one of GANO's best assistants should be given a Manchurian passport and a cover job in a Japanese military attache's office. At first he had been assigned to Col. ONOUCHI's office in Riga. (See Reference B). Later when this was closed as a result of the Russian invasion of the Baltic countries, he moved to Stockholm. When he arrived in Sweden there were two other Poles, WASZAROW GILEWICZ ? GIREVITCH and KOMAR, who were also working there. They controlled an espionage group in Copenhagen and the original plan had been for all three to remain and work against Germany and Russia. However, GIREVITCH was compromised when one of his agents was arrested by the Swedes in Goteburg. As a result, he was obliged to cease his activities and, eventually went to England in 1941. Thus, RUBIKOWSKI remained as the only P.I.S. representative. In order to secure additional cover he obtained a false Russian passport in the name of PIOTRE IWANOW from Finland, where he had contacts in the Finnish police. He had previously been using the alias MICHAILOVSKY.

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ONODERA worked with him on the most intimate terms until the spring of 1944 and refers to him as his "Chief of Staff." Although HUBIKOWSKI was employed in his office, he allowed him absolute independence in his intelligence activities and deliberately remained ignorant of the details of many of his operations. His two main targets were always Russia and Germany. He never gave ONODERA any information about the western Allies and ONODERA says that he never asked for any.

#### 4. Contact with London

Through HUBIKOWSKI, ONODERA was several times in direct contact with General SIKORSKI and the Polish General Staff in London, even after a state of war existed between their two countries. In 1942 when Poland declared war and the Polish mission in Japan were obliged to leave, two of the officers, SHURA and one other, made known their desire to remain in the Far East and continue their work against Russia in secret, but still in collaboration with the Japanese. The request that this be allowed was forwarded to Polish Headquarters in London through ONODERA's office. Within a short time General SIKORSKI answered that permission was given in accordance with the long tradition of collaboration between Poland and Japan. On another occasion ONODERA received a large number of paper reubles from Germany. He wanted to send these to Moscow and HUBIKOWSKI undertook to do it for him through the Polish diplomatic courier. This attempt was unsuccessful because the money was intercepted by the British at Gibraltar and was returned to Stockholm. Information gathered by the Polish mission in Moscow also reached ONODERA's office. Further details regarding this will be given below.

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5. The Polish-Japanese Organization.

HUBIKOWSKI had extensive connections with agents in Russia and throughout north eastern Europe. In cooperation with ONODERA he used the Japanese diplomatic missions and their courier system to transmit reports from these agents back to his London headquarters. In exchange for this service he undertook to share the contents of the reports.

The Japanese offices which played a part in this system were located in Germany, the Baltic countries, and Finland. Berlin was the central and most active clearing-point. There, another P.I.S. officer, JAKUBIC alias KUNCZLEWICZ, had been given a Japanese passport and worked in the Embassy with attaches MIURA and ISHIDA. He was assisted by a Polish woman named LAPINSKA, who had a job as secretary in the Manchurian Legation where she worked with First Secretary HOSHINO, attaches KASAI and YAMADA, and sometimes ANAKAWA, the Manchurian Consul in Hamburg. HOSHINO was a cover name used by General AKIHUSA, one of the best Japanese specialists on Russian intelligence who had been sent to Berlin as a Manchurian diplomat with a special mission to work through the Poles against Russia. He travelled back and forth frequently between Berlin and Warsaw. In Koenigsberg the office of the Japanese Consul, SUGIMURA was used. He had formerly taught Russian in the Japanese language school in Berlin, where KASAI and YAMADA had been his pupils. In Riga, before the Russian occupation, and later in Helsinki, ONOUCHI forwarded the reports through the Japanese courier to Stockholm.

ONODERA gives the following account of what he knows of these organizations.

a. South eastern Russia.

After the defeat of Poland in 1939 a group of Poles took refuge

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in the Ural and Caucasus region. Among them were former members of the P.I.S. who had been briefed and organized by GANO and RUBIKOWSKI before their departure. RUBIKOWSKI tried to establish communications with them from Stockholm. However, this proved too difficult and so a description of the organization and the list of agent's names were sent to Tokyo. ONODERA does not know how this was used by the Japanese, but he thinks that liaison with the group must have been made by the Japanese military attache in Persia or Turkey. General ISOMURA, the military attache in Ankara, probably would have been in charge of this at the time.

b. Bialistok, Minak, and Smolensk.

A network in this region where Bialistok had long been a center of P.I.S. activity was organized by Col. GANO in 1939. RUBIKOWSKI arranged for the information gathered by the agents to be picked up at railway stations by the Japanese couriers travelling back and forth between Tokyo, Moscow, and Berlin. In Germany it was received by JAKUBIC in the Berlin Embassy. He forwarded it to Stockholm and from there it went to London.

This system functioned successfully through 1940 until one of the couriers missed a connection and contact was lost. A plan was made to renew it by sending to Moscow, a P.I.S. officer whose cover name was THOMAS, from Warsaw, where he had remained since 1939. All preparations to do this had been completed including the password by which he was to contact YAMAGUCHI, Japanese military attache in Moscow, when the outbreak of the Russo-German war made it impossible.

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c. Poland; Resistance Movement.

Information obtained from the Polish underground also reached London through JAKUBIC, RUBIKOWSKI, and their Japanese collaborators. It was gathered in the Manchurian Consulate General in Warsaw under the direction of AKIKUNO HOSHINO by "THOMAS" and MISCHKEWITSCH, one of two Polish brothers, who spoke Japanese and who had formerly been employed in the Japanese Embassy, and forwarded through the Japanese couriers to Berlin. The Manchurians carried on the liaison in Warsaw because their Consulate remained open after the Japanese Embassy had closed down. This source went out of existence at the beginning of 1942.

d. Kaunas and Koenigsberg.

The center of this organization was located in the office of SUGIHARA. He was assisted by two Poles named PERZ and TADEUS whom he took with him when he moved from Lithuania to East Prussia after the Russian invasion. They were in contact with members of the Polish Resistance Movement who lived in KOWNO and the neighboring region. They worked under the leadership of JAKUBIC. While in Kaunas SUGIHARA received their reports and sent them by Japanese courier to Riga, where RUBIKOWSKI, who was working in ONOUCHI's office, gave them to Colonel BRZESKOWSKI, the Polish military attache (later assigned to Stockholm) who forwarded them to London. When he was in Koenigsberg, the reports were sent—still by Japanese courier—to Berlin, where they were taken by JAKUBIC and forwarded to London via RUBIKOWSKI and BRZESKOWSKI who had both moved to Stockholm. These reports covered Russian

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movements in Lithuania, their army and air force and German troop concentrations.

In April 1941 JAKUBIC was arrested in Berlin by the S.G. His interrogation revealed the whole network including Japanese participation and the role of the so-called "TAKASHI" in Stockholm. At about this time ONODERA relates that he planned to take RUBIKOWSKI with him on a trip to Berlin. The latter's visa had been obtained from the Germans with such facility that ONODERA became suspicious. On examining it and comparing it with his own, he found that it had a special marking. As a result of this RUBIKOWSKI thought it wiser to remain in Stockholm. When ONODERA arrived in Berlin, he was told of JAKUBIC's arrest. LAPINSKA was also arrested and in her possession the Germans found a hair brush handle of which contained microfilm of a report on the order of battle of the German Army on the Eastern Front. ONODERA was shown this by ROHLER as proof that the Poles had been working against the Germans. He later heard that PERL had escaped and reached Turkey.

The German government protested officially to OHIMA, the Japanese ambassador, who according to ONODERA, in order to clear himself put the blame on the office of the military attache in Stockholm. ONODERA says that he immediately telegraphed to Tokyo demanding to be recalled and threatening to commit hari-kiri if this were not done. The answer took a long time to come and by the time it did the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken place and

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ONODERA was busy with other matters.

RUBIKOWSKI remained in his office in spite of the Germans who never ceased their pressure for his dismissal. WAGNER, the chief of K. O. Schweden, came to ONODERA and demanded a list of "IRANON's" agents in Germany and Poland, threatening to protest to Tokyo through RIBBENTROP or KEITEL if it was not given. ONODERA ignored this demand and it was not until almost three years later that the Swedish government intervened and RUBIKOWSKI was expelled.

Note: Although ONODERA claims to be ignorant of further details concerning SUGIURA's organization the account which he has given definitely confirms the evidence obtained from the Sipo letter to GOERING of July 1941, quoted in Reference A, pages 8 and 31. Enquiries as to SUGIURA's present whereabouts have been made at the Japanese Foreign Office by this Headquarters. The answer was that he had remained in Roumania.

e. Helsinki.

RUBIKOWSKI had two sources in Finland. One was a Polish officer named KZABA who received information from agents in Russia. The other was the F.I.S. where he was in contact with POYRONEN, PAASONEN's assistant in charge of espionage. ONODERA knows no details of this relationship nor of the type of information exchanged.

Before the Russian invasion of the Baltic countries, RUBIKOWSKI received the information in Riga. Later, liaison was carried out by JULIO (cover name SCHMIDT) who frequently came to Stockholm for that purpose. Many of the reports from Helsinki

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were sent to Stockholm through ONOUCHI and the Japanese diplomatic bag, and others, ONOUCHI thinks, through United States diplomatic couriers. He explains this by the fact that American officials in Sweden and Finland were also interested in Russian intelligence. The Finnish organization functioned until August 1944.

f. Narva.

There were two Polish agents at Narva. They covered Russian troop movements and transportation of war material and sent their reports to Helsinki through AULIC. Later, after 1940, they established in direct communication with Britain over the northern route.

g. Riga.

Two Poles worked for RUBIKOWSKI in Latvia. They were KUBKIEWITZ and a woman whose name began with "M" and ended with "KA". (See also Reference B). Before 1940 they were in direct contact with RUBIKOWSKI and ONOUCHI. After the Russian invasion they communicated through AULIC and Estonian sailors in MAASING's organization. They ceased operations after the beginning of the Russo-German war.

h. Moscow

In August 1941 when General SIKORSKI's government sent an official mission to Moscow for the first time, a P.I.S. officer accompanied them. He was able to send information through to London whence it went to ONOUCHI in Stockholm through the Polish diplomatic bag. This source produced excellent information

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until 1942 when it was compromised through Russian penetration of Polish codes. (See below B nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5.)

ONODERA says that the Poles believed for a while that the cause of this had been a leak which occurred when the Japanese passed on the information to the Germans, however, the evidence subsequently given at the trials of the people involved revealed that it had been through the codes.

6. Results.

ONODERA was given the following information from reports which RUBIKOWSKI received from these sources:

A. February to June 1941:

- i. Russian troop movements in Lithuania, Latvia, and East Poland.
- ii. The concentration of German forces in East Prussia and near Warsaw.
- iii. The establishment of German air bases in Poland.  
Note: Through reports ii and iii, ONODERA was able to check and confirm other information which revealed the German plan to attack Russia.
- iv. Figures on railroad transportation of Russian troops and war materials in Eastern Poland.

B. July 1941 to December 1942.

- i. The Russian operational plan for the "Central Front".
- ii. Reports on Russian General Staff conversations in October 1941. These gave an account of the discussion between

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STALIN, who wanted to defend Moscow at all costs, and

TIMOSHENKO, who wanted to retreat behind the Volga.

- iii. Movement of Russian reserves called back from the Volga line to defend Moscow (winter 1941-1942).
- iv. Russian General Staff estimates of German operations in 1942. (STALIN feared a German attack against the left wing of the Moscow front)
- v. Russian plans in the spring of 1942 for strategic retreat to the Don-Stalingrad-Volga-Kuban line.
- vi. Reports concerning the removal of Russian war industry to the Ural region.

C. After 1942

- i. Frequent reports giving estimates of Russian strategic reserves.
- ii. Russian troop movements on north-eastern and central fronts.
- iii. Order of battle of the German Army.
- iv. Frequent reports with estimates of the production of German war industries.

In addition to providing facilities for communication, ONODERA gave the Poles information under the following headings:

- i. Russian troop movements in Europe and Asia. From Tokyo, German, Hungarian, and Finnish sources.
- ii. War potential of the USSR. From Tokyo and German sources.
- iii. Order of battle of the Russian Army. From German sources.
- iv. Technical developments in Germany and Russia. From German sources.

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#### 7. The Expulsion of "IHANOF"

At the beginning of 1944 the Germans finally succeeded in obtaining Swedish support for the expulsion of HUBIKOWSKI. General KILGREN came to ONODERA privately and told him that the Swedish government had positive evidence that "IHANOF" was an international spy---working for all, against all---and that unless ONODERA promised to get rid of him at once, the government would take official action. ONODERA tried in vain to get this decision changed by appealing to PETERSEN and KAMP. He was finally obliged to arrange for HUBIKOWSKI's departure. He at first considered sending him to Finland, where PAASONEN was willing to receive him but after several months, he went to England, and later to Italy. ONODERA's last message from him was received just before repatriation and came from the Headquarters of General ANDERS' Army.

#### 8. The STEPHAN Source.

Before leaving HUBIKOWSKI made an agreement to send ONODERA information from England for which he was to be paid in dollars. His reports were to be signed "JOHANSSON" and were to be handed to ONODERA by BRANKOWSKI or one of his assistants. ONODERA was to reach HUBIKOWSKI through a Pole named STEPHAN GADOWSKI. His letters were to be inscribed with three names: Mr. BERO, RZABA, and STEPHAN. ONODERA received about 25 letters from this source.

At first in the summer of 1944 the information was good. It concerned Allied military activities in India and Burma. At the end of the year it began to deteriorate. The reports then told of an impending British attack on Borneo which was belied by all other developments of the war. They gave much information about Japanese war crimes, and stories about the low morale of the

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Japanese troops. At this time ONODERA became convinced that he was receiving deception material, however, he continued to send money, paying in all about 10,000 American dollars for the information. He feels sure that it all went to the British, but he declares himself more than happy to have paid this price for the entry of HURIKOWSKI into Great Britain. After three and a half years working in a Japanese office it was evident that some price would have to be paid. ONODERA says that at heart, he would much rather think of HURIKOWSKI as having sent deception material, and thus remained to the end, loyal to the cause of the western Allies.

9. Contacts after V J Day

After the German surrender ONODERA received occasional personal letters from HURIKOWSKI and two messages from Col. GANO. They all came through BRZEZKOWSKI's office. One of GANO's messages announced the impending Russian declaration of war against Japan, and the other gave details of the movement of ten Russian divisions to the Far Eastern front.

10. After V J Day

ONODERA's contacts with the Poles continued even after the Japanese surrender. He says that in October 1945 BRZEZKOWSKI came to see him on behalf of Col. GANO, asked if he was in need of money, and said that if he was not on good terms with the new Japanese government, the Poles would take care of him and his family. Later, when the Japanese repatriation party was in Naples, ONODERA was interviewed by a French colonel named GOLAFFROY who showed him a letter from Col. GANO recommending the best treatment for ONODERA—"a faithful friend of Poland." He has absolute confidence in his prestige with the Poles and offers to use it in establishing a working contact between them and United States services.

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11. STACHOWIAK & DONOA.

ONODERA says that in 1944, a young Pole who gave his name as DONOA came to the military attache's office and was interviewed by KIGOSHI. He said that he had escaped from Poland and was on his way to America. He offered his services to the Japanese. KIGOSHI introduced him to ONODERA, but he made a very bad impression and it was decided to break off contact immediately. ONODERA denies that DONOA told him anything about having formerly worked for the Abwehr or being directed to Stockholm by the Japanese military attache's office in Berlin.

12. Japanese specialists.

ONODERA has supplied the following list of Japanese officers who have all been at one time on duty as military attaches in Poland and should be informed of Polish activities in the Far East during the war.

Note: The names of those considered to be especially well qualified are marked with an asterisk.

\*Major General YAMANAKI Masataka, twice on duty in Poland, first in the twenties and again from 1934 to 1936. Later commanded the Japanese forces in Borneo (?)

Col. General OKABE Masaburo. Teacher in the war college on duty in Poland during the twenties.

Lt. General HIRUUCHI Kiichiro. In Poland during the twenties.

Intelligence officer. At the end of the war commander in North Japan (?)

Lt. General SUZUKI Shigeyasu.

In Poland about 1929, operations officer.

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\*Lt. General MATSUKI Hikosaburo.

On duty in Poland 1930 to 1932. Intelligence officer,  
organization specialist. Worked in Russian section of  
Dept. II. Later assistant military attache in Moscow, 1936.

Lt. General YAMAGUCHI Genzo.

On duty in Poland 1932 to 1934. Chief of Japanese military  
intelligence in Harbin, 1940 (?)

Lt. General FUJITSUKA

Assistant to YAMAGUCHI in Warsaw. Intelligence officer,  
Russian specialist. Said to know a lot about penetration of  
the U.S.S.R.

Lt. General SANADA Shigeru

On duty in Poland 1936 to 1938. Intelligence officer. At the  
end of the war, commander in Shanghai (?)

\*Major General UKEDA Masao

On duty in Poland 1938 to 1939. Cooperated closely with  
Col. GAWO. Intelligence officer, worked in General Staff,  
Dept. 2, Russian section.

\*Major General FUJITSUKA

Military attache to Romania, 1939 to 1942. Well informed on  
Polish collaboration with the Japanese in south eastern Europe.

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